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I. INTRODUCTION
County regulations require that you visit your preacher before you visit your
bartender. No alcohol purchases before noon on Sundays.1
Approximately half of the fifty states2 and numerous munici-
palities3 maintain and enforce legislation that prohibits the sale of
1. Sign at a concession stand in the Nashville International Airport. See Code of
Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee § 7.08.170(C) (1995)
(making the sale of beer between 3:00 a.m. and noon on Sunday illegal).
2. See, for example, Alaska Stat. § 04.11.410 (Michie, 1995) (barring issuance of liquor
licenses to establishments located within 200 feet of a church building in Alaska); Ark. Code
Ann. § 3-4-206 (Michie, 1995) (prohibiting liquor sales within 200 yards of a school or church in
Arkansas); Ga. Code Ann. § 3-3-21(A) (Michie, 1995) (barring the sale of distilled spirits within
100 yards of a church building and within 200 yards of a school in Georgia); 235 Ill. Comp. Stat.
5/6-11 (West, 1996) (prohibiting the issuance of licenses for the sale of alcoholic liquor for
premises located within 100 feet of a church or school in Illinois); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 243.220
(Banks-Baldwin, 1995) (barring the issuance of liquor licenses for establishments located within
200 feet of any building used as a church in Kentucky); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 28-A, § 351
(West, 1995) (prohibiting the location of liquor stores within 300 feet of schools or churches in
Maine); Md. Ann. Code art. 2B, § 9-204.3 (1995) (barring the issuance of new liquor licenses for
premises located within 300 feet of a church or school in Baltimore, Maryland); Mich. Stat. Ann.
§ 18.988(1) (Law. Co-op., 1994) (mandating the denial of a liquor license application in the event
the contemplated location is within 500 feet of a church or school building .in Michigan); Miss.
Code Ann. § 67-1-51(h)(3) (1995) (prohibiting the issuance of liquor licenses to establishments
located within 400 feet of any church, school, kindergarten, or funeral home in Mississippi,
except in commercial areas, where the minimum distance drops to 100 feet); Mont. Code Ann. §
16-3-306 (1995) (barring the issuance of retail liquor licenses for premises located within 600
feet of buildings used exclusively as churches or schools in Montana); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 53-177
(1995) (prohibiting liquor license issuance to establishments located within 150 feet of churches,
schools, hospitals, and other institutions in Nebraska); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 33:1-76 (West, 1994)
(barring the issuance of licenses for the sale of alcohol within 200 feet of any church or public
school in New Jersey); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 60-6B-10 (Michie, 1995) (proscribing the grant of
licenses for the sale of alcoholic beverages within 300 feet of any church or school in New
Mexico); N.Y. Alco. Bev. Cont. Law § 105 (1995) (prohibiting the issuance of a license to sell
alcohol for off-premises consumption for a facility on the same street as, and within 200 feet of,
a building occupied exclusively as a school, church, synagogue, or other place of worship in New
York); 37 Okla. Stat. Ann. § 163.23 (West, 1995) (making it unlawful for any place licensed to
sell low-point beer for on-premises consumption to be located within 300 feet of a public school
or church property in Oklahoma); R.I. Gen. Laws § 3-7-19 (1994) (barring the issuance of liquor
licenses to establishments situated within 200 feet of any school or place of public worship in
Rhode Island); S.C. Code Ann. § 61-3-440 (Law. Co-op., 1993) (barring the issuance of new liquor
licenses to establishments located within 300 feet of a church, school, or playground located
within a municipality, or 500 feet of such an institution situated outside a municipality in South
Carolina); Utah Code Ann. § 32A-3-101(3)(b) (1995) (requiring that no package store be located
within 200 feet of a church in Utah).
3. Tennessee, Oregon, and several other states make the restriction of liquor sales a
matter of local option. See, for example, Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 57-5-105, 57-5-106 (1995); Or. Rev.
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alcohol close to churches. A number of other states allow their liquor-
licensing authorities to consider proposed vendors' proximity to
churches. 4 Likewise, states and municipalities in all regions of the
country have laws that restrict the sale of alcohol on Sunday. 5
Notwithstanding the secular justifications offered by the pro-
ponents of such legislation, analysis reveals that it is religiously moti-
vated. Although the Bible contains no clear mandate against the sale,
purchase, or consumption of alcohol,6 history illustrates that
prohibitions on the sale of alcohol on Sunday evolved from British and
colonial laws that codified the Fourth Commandment's requirement
Stat. § 471.506 (1994). Many municipalities in these states have passed ordinances prohibiting
the sale of alcoholic beverages in the vicinity of churches. See, for example, Code of the
Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee § 7.08.090(A)(1) (1995)
CNo beer permit shall be issued to an applicant whose location is less than one hundred feet
from a church .. ") and § 7.16.110(A) (1992) (prohibiting the sale of intoxicating liquors other
than beer "within one hundred yards of any church").
4. See, for example, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 23789(a) (West, 1995) (authorizing the
California licensing body to refuse to issue licenses for establishments located in the vicinity of
churches and hospitals); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 30-36 (1994) (giving Connecticut licensing
authorities the discretion to refuse to issue licenses if the location of the premises will
detrimentally affect on church or school); 4 Del. Code Ann. § 543(c) (1995) (giving the Delaware
licensing commission discretion to refuse to grant liquor licenses to any establishment located
near a school or church); Ind. Code Ann. § 7.1-3-21-10 (West 1995) (requiring applicants in
Indiana to disclose the proximity of their institutions to schools or churches and making this a
factor for the board to consider); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4303.292(B)(1) (Baldwin 1994) (granting
the Ohio licensing authority discretion to refuse to issue licenses to premises whose operation
will adversely affect normal activities at a school or a church); Wash. Rev. Code § 66.24.010
(1995) (requiring the Washington licensing board to consider the proximity of an applicant's
business to churches, schools, and other public institutions); W. Va. Code § 11-16-18 (1995)
(authorizing the West Virginia licensing commissioner to refuse to issue licenses for premises
within 300 feet of any school or church).
5. See, for example, Ala. Code § 28-3A-25(a)(1) (1995) (making it unlawful to sell, trade,
or barter in alcoholic beverages between 9:00 p.m. Saturday and 2:00 a.m. the following
Monday); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 4-244 (West, 1995) (making the sale of liquor between 1:00 a.m.
and 10:00 a.m. Sunday unlawful); Ark. Code Ann. § 3-3-210 (1995) (making it a misdemeanor to
sell alcoholic beverages on Sunday); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 30-91 (1994) (making the sale,
consumption, or dispensing of alcoholic beverages on Sunday between 2:00 a.m. and 11:00 a.m. a
misdemeanor); Ordinances of Metropolitan Nashville-Davidson County, Tenn. § 7.08.170(C)
(1995) (making the sale of beer between 3:00 a.m. and noon on Sunday unlawful).
6. In general, the Bible condemns drunkenness but does not forbid drinking alcohol. See
Ephesians 5:18 ("And do not get drunk with wine, for that is debauchery; but be filled with the
Spirit."); I Timothy 3:2-3 ("A bishop then must be above reproach .... no drunkard....").
Indeed, Jesus's first miracle was turning water into wine to provide approximately 120 gallons
of wine for a wedding reception. See John 2:1-11. See also I Timothy 5:23 (urging Timothy not
to "drink only water, but use a little wine for the sake of your stomach and your frequent
ailments"). Scripture does, however, urge caution. See, for example, Proverbs 20:1 ("Wine is a
mocker, strong drink a brawler; and whoever is led astray by it is not wise."); Romans 13:13
(Let us conduct ourselves becomingly as in the day, not in revelling and drunkenness... ");
Proverbs 23:31-33 (warning that wine "goes down smoothly" but "bites like a serpene').
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that the Sabbath be respected.7 Both these laws and those that ban
the sale of alcohol near churches are rooted in a perceived incompati-
bility between religious worship and alcohol.8 Indeed, such enact-
ments are intended to protect or insulate religion from the disruption
and moral corruption associated with alcohol. Moreover, as the sign
quoted above demonstrates, these enactments objectively appear to be
religiously motivated. For these reasons, such laws implicate the
Establishment Clause.
The Establishment Clause provides that "Congress shall make
no law respecting an establishment of religion .... -9 Together with
the Free Exercise Clause, this provision restricts the government
from interfering with religious liberty.10 The vague language of this
seemingly simple pronouncement" obfuscates its meaning and
scope.' 2  At the very least, the Establishment Clause prohibits the
7. For example, the predecessor to one of the Maryland statutes challenged in McGowan
v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 470-75 (1961), made it criminal to "profane the Sabbath or Lord's
day called Sunday by... drunkenness .... Id. at 445 (quoting An Act Concerning Religion, 1
Archives of Maryland 244-47 (1649)). Indeed, the series of statutes at issue in
McGowan-including a number of provisions restricting the sale of alcoholic beverages on
Sunday-was entitled "Sabbath breaking," even at the time the case was decided. McGowan,
366 U.S. at 445, 453-60 (Appendix of the Opinion of the Court). In his dissent, Justice Douglas
described Sunday Blue Laws as "enunciation[s] of the Fourth Commandment." Id. at 470-75
(Douglas, J., dissenting).
8. The publications of one religious group are illustrative. See, for example, Christian
Life Commission, Issues & Answers: Alcohol 5 (Baptist General Convention of Texas, no date)
("From the first temperance movements in this country over a hundred years ago until the
present time, churches have been in the forefront of the efforts to control the sale of alcoholic
beverages."); Christian Life Commission, The Bible Speaks on Alcohol ("[B]oth general Bible
principles and specific Bible teachings help Christians today to abstain from the dangerous drug
[alcohol].").
9. U.S. Const., Amend. I.
10. By its own language, the First Amendment restricts only the federal government.
However, by incorporating the First Amendment into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Supreme Court has applied the First Amendment to state governments as
well. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) ('rhe First Amendment declares
that Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof. The Fourteenth Amendment has rendered the legislatures of the states as
incompetent as Congress to enact such laws.").
11. Espresso, Inc. v. District of Columbia, 884 F. Supp. 7, 9 (D.D.C. 1995).
12. See Thomas R. McCoy, A Coherent Methodology for First Amendment Speech and
Religion Clause Cases, 48 Vand. L. Rev. 1335, 1335-36 (1995) (noting that although the Supreme
Court has consistently articulated the same test in establishment clause cases over the years, it
has failed to articulate a meaningful distinction between those governmental actions that
violate the clause and those that do not).
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adoption of an official state religion.13 Read more liberally, it bars any
aid to or endorsement of religion by the government. 14
The Supreme Court has consistently interpreted the
Establishment Clause to prohibit the legislative majority from impos-
ing religious beliefs on or requiring religious practices of citizens.' 5
The Court has long tolerated, however, numerous religious pro-
nouncements by the government, characterized by one scholar as "de
minimis" and historical exceptions to the prohibition.' 6 Examples of
these exceptions are the motto "In God We Trust" that appears on our
currency, the "one nation under God" language in the Pledge of
Allegiance, and invocations by ministers or rabbis at the openings of
sessions of Congress and various state legislatures.' 7 Although these
practices undeniably constitute governmental endorsements of the
beliefs of theists over those of atheists, the Court apparently views
them as harmless and has upheld them in the face of attack.' 8
Even if we accept such religious pronouncements as harmless,
pro forma "establishments" of religion, laws that prohibit activities
because of their incompatibility with majority religious values cannot
be so characterized. Legislative enactments that restrict the sale of
alcohol on Sunday or in the vicinity of churches go far beyond mere
verbalistic ritual. These laws target behavior precisely because it is
13. At least two Supreme Court justices interpret the Establishment Clause to go no
further. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 113 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (asserting
that the Establishment Clause merely prohibits the adoption of an official state religion);
Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 610 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (same).
14. The Supreme Court has asserted that the First Amendment mandates governmental
neutrality toward religion:
Government in our democracy, state and national, must be neutral in matters of
religious theory, doctrine, and practice. It may not be hostile to any religion or to the
advocacy of no-religion; and it may not aid, foster, or promote one religion or religious
theory against another or even against the militant opposite. The First Amendment
mandates governmental neutrality between religion and religion, and between religion
and nonreligion.
Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1968).
15. See School District of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 220 (1963) ('We
repeat again that neither a State nor the Federal Government can constitutionally force a
person to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion.") (quoting Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S.
488, 495 (1961)). See also McCoy, 48 Vand. L. Rev. at 1337 (cited in note 12).
16. McCoy, 48 Vand. L. Rev. at 1338-39 (cited in note 12).
17. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 716-17 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(suggesting that such exceptions are examples of "ceremonial deism" which have lost through
rote repetition any significant religious content) (citation omitted). See also McCoy, 48 Vand. L.
Rev. at 1338 (cited in note 12).
18. McCoy, 48 Vand. L. Rev. at 1338-39 (cited in note 12). See, for example, Marsh v.
Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (upholding a state legislature's practice of opening sessions with
a prayer).
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believed to be inimical to religious worship. For this reason, such
laws raise core establishment clause concerns.
This Note analyzes such enactments under the Establishment
Clause. Part II briefly examines the Supreme Court's methodology
for deciding establishment clause cases. Part III traces the judicial
treatment of state and local regulatory schemes thought to raise first
amendment concerns. Parts IV and V demonstrate that legislative
enactments banning the sale of alcohol on Sunday or near churches
represent efforts by the legislative majority to prevent citizens from
engaging in activity considered to be incompatible with the practices
and beliefs of the dominant denominations. Such laws should be
struck down as per se infringements of the Establishment Clause.
Finally, Parts IV and V also establish that even if such enactments
are not per se invalid, they impermissibly endorse religion and cause
political divisiveness along religious lines.
II. EVALUATION OF LEGISLATION UNDER THE ESTABLISHMENT
CLAUSE: THE LEMON TEST
Courts almost always consider establishment clause challenges
to legislative enactments using the test articulated by the Supreme
Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman.19 In order to survive scrutiny under the
Lemon test, an enactment must: (1) reflect a clear secular purpose;
(2) have a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion;
and (3) avoid excessive governmental entanglement with religion.20
Unless a legislative enactment 2' meets all three of these criteria, it is
invalid under the Establishment Clause.22
19. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). Lemon invalidated two state statutes. The Rhode Island Salary
Supplement Act provided for a salary supplement to be paid to teachers in nonpublic schools,
including parochial schools, at which the average per-pupil expenditure on secular education
was below the average in state public schools. Id. at 607-08. Pennsylvania's Nonpublic
Elementary and Secondary Education Act authorized the state to reimburse private schools,
including parochial schools, for textbooks, instructional materials, and teachers' salaries. Id. at
609-10.
20. Id. at 612-13. This three-part methodology represents an amalgamation of the various
tests used by the Court in the years preceding the decision. Id.
21. The Lemon Court articulated and applied its methodology in evaluating the validity of
the statutes. The Court has since employed the test in evaluating not only legislative enact-
ments but also other forms of governmental action alleged to violate the Establishment Clause.
For example, in Allegheny County v. American Civil Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573 (1989) and
Lynch, 465 U.S. at 668, the Court employed the Lemon methodology in deciding whether local
governments' Christmas displays were unconstitutional.
22. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 40-41 (1980).
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In application, the Lemon methodology merely provides the
basic framework within which courts decide whether a governmental
action constitutes an invalid establishment of religion.23 It offers little
guidance to courts about how to approach each of the three relevant
inquiries.2 4 Commentators have criticized the Lemon methodology for
forcing courts to make ad hoc value judgments. 25 Several Supreme
Court justices have attacked the Lemon methodology for its
incoherence, and some have even called for its repudiation.26
Moreover, the contradictory results the test has produced during its
twenty-five year history evidence its shortcomings as a guideline for
objective decisionmaking.27 Nevertheless, the Lemon test has
survived as the framework for evaluating legislative enactments
under the Establishment Clause.28
23. See Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 394 (1983) (stating that the Lemon test "provides
'no more than [a] helpful [signpost]' in dealing with Establishment Clause challenges") (quoting
Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 741 (1973)). See also Scott Titshaw, Note, Sharpening the
Prongs of the Establishment Clause: Applying Stricter Scrutiny to Majority Religions, 23 Ga. L.
Rev. 1085, 1098 (1989) (describing Lemon as "providing a skeleton on which future courts could
build").
24. McCoy, 48 Vand. L. Rev. at 1352 (cited in note 12).
25. See, for example, Titshaw, 23 Ga. L. Rev. at 1099 (cited in note 23) (noting the Court's
propensity to use the Lemon test as a justification for ad hoc decisionmaking). See also McCoy,
48 Vand. L. Rev. at 1354-55 (cited in note 12) (asserting that use of the Lemon test has resulted
in ad hoc decisionmaking).
26. See Wallace, 472 U.S. at 110-11 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (calling for the
repudiation of the Lemon approach because of confusion in its application); Committee for Public
Education v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 671 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (advocating the
abandonment of the "blurred, indistinct, and invariable" barrier between church and state
created by Lemon, and for a return to Jefferson's "high and impregnable" wall); Edwards, 482
U.S. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (calling for the abandonment of the Lemon "maze"); Lamb's
Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District, 113 S. Ct. 2141, 2149-50, 124 L. Ed. 2d
352, 365 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (describing the Lemon methodology as a "ghoul in a late-
night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles abroad, after being
repeatedly killed and buried"); id. at 2149 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (criticizing the Court's
citation of Lemon as "unsettling and unnecessary").
27. For example, compare Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968) (holding that
the government may lend books to students in church-sponsored schools) with Wolman v. Wal-
ter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977) (holding that the government may not lend magazines, maps, and other
materials to students in church-sponsored schools). Also compare Mueller, 463 U.S. at 383
(upholding a scheme allowing tax deductions and tuition reimbursement for the parents of paro-
chial school students) with Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973)
(invalidating a similar scheme).
28. In only a handful of establishment clause cases since Lemon has the Court failed to
rely explicitly on the Lemon methodology. In Marsh, 463 U.S. at 792, for example, the Court re-
lied upon historical patterns to uphold the Nebraska legislature's practice of opening its
legislative sessions with a prayer. In Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 252 (1982), the Court
stated that the Lemon methodology is intended to apply to laws affording a uniform benefit to
all religions and not to enactments that discriminate among religions. The Larson Court
reasoned, however, that the concerns embodied in the Lemon methodology warranted the
application of strict scrutiny to the Minnesota law at issue. Id.
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A. The Purpose Prong: Governmental Action Must Have a Valid
Secular Purpose
The first component of the Lemon test29 poses the threshold
question of whether a governmental action deliberately aids or en-
dorses religion. ° If so, the action is per se unconstitutional.31
Lemon does not tell courts how to determine whether a legisla-
tive enactment is intended to aid or promote religion. The statutes at
issue in Lemon contained clear statements of secular purpose. 32 The
Court accepted these declarations because of the lack of any
indication that the legislature's actual intent differed from its stated
intent.33 By inquiring about actual intent, however, the Lemon Court
implied that analysis under the first prong of the test requires more
than mere examination of the statute for a statement of secular pur-
pose. 34 Thus, the existence of such a declaration does not resolve the
question of whether a statute passes muster under the first prong.35
Similarly, the Lemon test does not tell courts how to evaluate
enactments that are silent as to purpose. As a result, courts have
adopted a variety of approaches in analyzing such laws. In one
In a more recent case, Board of Education of Kiryas Joel v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481, 2487-
90, 2491-94, 129 L. Ed. 2d 546 (1994) (plurality opinion), Justice Souter did not directly rely
upon the Lemon test to invalidate a New York law that created an autonomous public school
district for a religious community. He employed the language of the test, however, and referred
to the case through two "see also" citations. Id. at 2488. See also Derrick R. Freijomil,
Comment, Has the Court Soured on Lemon?: A Look into the Future of Establishment Clause
Jurisprudence, 5 Seton Hall Const. L. J. 141, 193 n.200 (1994) (analyzing Grumet). In a
concurring opinion, Justice Blackmun stressed that the Courts decision did not "signal[ ] a de-
parture" from Lemon's principles. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. at 2494 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
29. The first prong of the Lemon test is often referred to as the "purpose prong."
30. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 691 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating that the proper inquiry
under the first prong of Lemon is whether the government intends its action to convey a mes-
sage of endorsement of religion); McCoy, 48 Vand. L. Rev. at 1352 (cited in note 12).
31. McCoy, 48 Vand. L. Rev. at 1352 (cited in note 12). See also McGowan v. Maryland,
366 U.S. 420, 575 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (There is in this realm no room for balanc-
ing.") (cited in note 12). The examples of "ceremonial deism" discussed above constitute
exceptions to this rule. See notes 16-18 and accompanying text.
32. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613.
33. Id. The Court did not explain how much deference to the legislature was "appropriate"
in the face of a statement of secular purpose.
34. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690-91 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating that the requirement
is not satisfied by the mere existence of a secular purpose). But see id. at 681 & n.6 (Burger,
C.J.) (asserting that the "narrow question" under the first prong is simply "whether there is a
secular purpose" and stating that the statute's purpose need not be "exclusively secular").
35. In Stone, 449 U.S. at 41-42, the Court invalidated a state statute mandating the post-
ing of a copy of the Ten Commandments on the walls of all public school classrooms. The Court
found that the statute had an impermissible religious motive, rejecting a legislative statement
of secular purpose. Id. See also Cynthia A. Krebs, Recent Development, The Establishment
Clause and Liquor Sales: The Supreme Court Rushes in Where Angels Fear to Tread-Larkin v.
Grenders Den, 103 S. Ct. 505 (1982), 59 Wash. L. Rev. 87, 91 n.30 (1983) (analyzing Stone).
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instance, the Supreme Court assumed that a statute silent as to
intent embraced a valid secular purpose, performing all analysis
under the second and third prongs of the test.36 Other courts have
inferred secular motivation from the statutory text and from
surrounding circumstances.37 Still others have drawn the opposite
inference, finding an impermissible religious motive in the absence of
an explicit statement of purpose.3
B. The Effect Prong: Governmental Action Must Not Have the
Primary Effect of Advancing Religion
Once a court concludes that a legislative enactment is not
intended to aid religion, it must determine whether the enactment
nonetheless raises establishment clause concerns. The second prong39
of the Lemon test requires a court to ask whether the governmental
action results in too much inadvertent aid to or endorsement of
religion.40 If the action has this effect, regardless of the legislature's
purpose, it is invalid under the Establishment Clause.41 Like the first
portion of the test, however, the "effect prong" offers courts
insufficient guidance: how much inadvertent aid or endorsement
renders governmental action invalid?42
36. See Larkin v. Grendel's Den Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 123-24 & n.6 (1982), in which the
Supreme Court assumed that a state law silent on legislative motive served a valid secular
purpose but noted the existence of less restrictive means of serving that purpose. It is unclear
from the case whether, for that reason, the statute would have failed under the first prong of
the Lemon test. Espresso, 884 F. Supp. at 10 n.7 (citing Grendel's Den, 459 U.S. at 123-24 &
n.6). The Court evaluated the law "[i]ndependent[ly] of the first of [the Lemon] criteria,"
Grendel's Den, 459 U.S. at 123, and explicitly held that the statute violated the second and third
prongs of the test. Id. at 126. A court could not adopt this approach in finding an enactment
valid under the Establishment Clause because, in order to survive, such an enactment must
satisfy all three components of the Lemon methodology. It was only because the legislation in
Grendel's Den failed the other prongs that the Court did not need to examine it under the first
prong.
37. See, for example, Silver Rose Entertainment, Inc. v. Clay County, 646 So.2d 246, 252
(Fla. Ct. App. 1994) CBecause the challenged ordinance has no explicit statement of purpose, we
are left to infer its purposes.., and we are unwilling to presume any unconstitutional motive.").
38. See, for example, Griswold Inn, Inc. v. State, 441 A.2d 16 (Conn. 1981) (stating that a
statute's lack of an explicit statement of purpose revealed that the legislative motive in passing
it could not have been secular).
39. The second portion of the Lemon test is often called the "effect prong."
40. McCoy, 48 Vand. L. Rev. at 1352 (cited in note 12).
41. Id.
42. See id. at 1353 (discussing the ambiguities of the second prong of the Lemon test).
The Lemon Court did not apply the second prong of its test to the statutes in question. Lemon,
403 U.S. at 613-14. Its holding that the enactments were unconstitutional was based solely on
analysis under the third component. Id. at 614.
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The Court attempted to refine the effect prong in several cases
decided in the years following Lemon. In Committee for Public
Education v. Nyquist, 43 the Court interpreted the effect prong to re-
quire the invalidation of any law having a "direct and substantial"
effect-as opposed to a "remote and incidental" effect-of advancing
religion.4 The Nyquist Court did not elaborate on the meaning of
these terms. Although the Court has frequently cited the Nyquist
reading of the effect prong,45 this interpretation offers little clarifica-
tion. It merely defines one vague term with several others. 46
The Court more effectively explained the effect component of
the test in Allegheny County v. American Civil Liberties Union.47 The
Allegheny Court stated that whether governmental conduct has the
effect of endorsing religion depends on the message that the action
communicates. 8 According to the Court, the relevant question is
whether the challenged governmental action is likely to be regarded
by adherents of the denominations that purportedly benefit from it as
an endorsement, and by nonadherents as a disapproval, of their
individual religious choices. 49 If a governmental action results in such
apparent endorsement of religion, it is unconstitutional. 50
Thus, the relevant precedent illustrates that the effect prong
embodies two separate, but related, considerations. First, it directs a
court to consider the actual effect of a governmental act. If such an
act has the effect of providing too much inadvertent aid to religion, it
is unconstitutional. Second, the effect prong directs a court to decide
whether a governmental act gives the objective appearance of provid-
43. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
44. Id. at 784-85 n.39.
45. Gary J. Simson, The Establishment Clause in the Supreme Courtk Rethinking the
Court's Approach, 72 Cornell L. Rev. 905, 918 & n.58 (1987) (citing Grand Rapids School
District v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 394 (1985); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 366 (1975)).
46. Simson, 72 Cornell L. Rev. at 918 (cited in note 45). Simson argues that because
Nyquist used two pairs of words in refining the effect prong, it is unclear whether the Court was
attempting to label the opposite ends of one or two different spectrums. Id. He also points out
that the Court further confused the issue by using these same terms in its analysis under the
other two steps of the Lemon methodology. Id.
47. 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
48. Id. at 595. The Court relied heavily upon the rationale of Justice O'Connor's concur-
rence in Lynch.
49. Id. at 597. The Court stressed that a governmental act need not coerce participation
in or abstention from a particular religious practice to be found unconstitutional. Id. at 597 n.7.
50. A number of commentators have treated the "apparent endorsement" consideration as
an alternative methodology to the Lemon test. See, for example, Freijomil, 5 Seton Hall Const.
L. J. at 202-03 (cited in note 28) (discussing Justice O'Connor's endorsement test as an
alternative to Lemon). However, a majority of the Court first adopted the "appearance of
endorsement' consideration in the context of the effect prong. See Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 595
("The effect of the display depends upon the message that the government's practice
communicates .... ).
1500 [Vol. 49:1491
ESTABLISHMENT CLA USE
ing too much aid to religion.51 If so, the act is invalid under the
Establishment Clause, even if its actual effect does not rise to an
impermissible level.
C. The Entanglement Prong: Excessive Entanglement Between
Government and Religion and Political Divisiveness Along Religious
Lines
The third inquiry of the Lemon methodology52 applies to gov-
ernmental action that is not intended to aid or endorse religion and
that does not inadvertently provide too much aid or endorsement.
Such action is nonetheless unconstitutional if it results in excessive
entanglement between government and religion53 or if it causes
political divisiveness along religious lines.54
Application of the entanglement component in Lemon itself
and in a number of other cases indicates that it prohibits the govern-
ment from associating too closely and conspicuously with religion,
even though the "primary effect" of the unintentional aid is not sig-
nificant enough to violate the second component of the test.55 In ad-
ministering this component of the test, the Lemon Court considered
the character and purpose of the institutions benefited by the
governmental action at issue, the nature of the state aid, and the
resulting relationship between the government and religious
authorities. 56 The Court stated that governmental aid to institutions
with substantial religious character could give rise to entangled
church-state relations of the sort the First Amendment proscribes. 57
Applying this rationale, the Lemon Court found parochial schools to
involve substantial religious activity and purpose.5 8 The Court then
reasoned that providing such institutions with the type of aid at issue
would require continuing and comprehensive governmental surveil-
lance of religious activity or institutions in order to ensure compliance
51. See Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 595.
52. The third prong of the Lemon methodology is often called the "entanglement prong."
53. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13.
54. Id. at 622-23.
55. McCoy, 48 Vand. L. Rev. at 1353 (cited in note 12). See also Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 780
(stating that the third prong of Lemon prohibits "too intrusive and continuing a relationship be-
tween Church and State").
56. Lemon, 403 U.S at 615.
57. Id. at 616.
58. Id.
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with related restrictions.59  The Court concluded that the
Establishment Clause prohibits such an intimate and continuing rela-
tionship between government and religion.60
The Lemon Court also considered potential political divisive-
ness along religious lines to be an important factor under the entan-
glement prong.61 The Court reasoned that state assistance to church-
related schools would engender considerable political activity, both by
supporters of such institutions and by opponents of state aid.62
Political candidates would be forced to choose sides, and citizens
would vote according to their religious convictions. 63 The Court con-
cluded that this kind of "political division along religious lines was
one of the principal evils against which the First Amendment was
intended to protect."s4
The Lemon Court seems to have considered political
fragmentation along religious lines sufficient to render state schemes
invalid under the entanglement prong.65 More recently, however,
several courts have commented that the Court has never used
political divisiveness as an independent ground for invalidating a
governmental practice. 66 Even if this is true, the Court has not ruled
59. The Court reasoned that the aid schemes would require the states to monitor the
schools in order to ensure that they did not use the money for religious purposes. Id. at 619.
This surveillance, the Court reasoned, would amount to excessive entanglement between
government and religion. Id.
60. Id. at 620.
61. See id. at 622-24 (describing the "divisive political potential" of the state programs at
issue as "[a] broader base of entanglement of yet a different character"). Subsequent cases have
also considered governmental actions' potential political divisiveness to be a relevant factor
under the entanglement prong. See, for example, Lynch, 465 U.S. at 689 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (citing Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 796; Lemon, 403 U.S. at 623).
This concern is closely related to the apparent endorsement inquiry that the Allegheny
Court included under the second prong of the test. Both examinations reason that conspicuous
governmental entanglement in matters of religion, upon which adherents of particular faiths
take strong positions in public, is likely to cause people to align their votes with their faith.
Lemon, 403 U.S. at 622-23. This kind of division threatens the normal political process by
obscuring important secular issues. Id.
In at least one case the Court has voiced this concern under both the second and third
prongs. See Grendel's Den, 459 U.S. at 125-27 (considering the "symbolic benefit" and inherent
"potential for conflict" under the second prong and the "danger of political fragmentation... on
religious lines" under the third prong).
62. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 622.
63. Id.
64. Id. (quoting Paul A. Freund, Comment, Public Aid to Parochial Schools, 82 Harv. L.
Rev. 1680, 1692 (1969)).
65. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 623-24. See also John Morton Cummings, Comment, The
State, The Stork, and the Wall The Establishment Clause and Statutory Abortion Regulation,
39 Cath. U. L. Rev. 1191, 1209 (1990) (stating that the Lemon Court "ruled that the statutes
also violated the entanglement test because of political divisiveness.. ").
66. See, for example, Lynch, 465 U.S. at 684 ("[Tlhis Court has never held that political
divisiveness alone was sufficient to invalidate government conduct.").
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that political fragmentation could never alone provide the basis for
invalidating of governmental action. And, at the very least, this type
of divisiveness serves as a "warning signal" that the Establishment
Clause has been violated.67
Thus, the entanglement prong, like the effect prong, embodies
two separate considerations. First, a court must determine whether
governmental action that inadvertently aids religion will require too
close and continuing a relationship between the government and
religious institutions. Second, a court must decide whether the
governmental action is likely to result in political divisiveness along
religious lines. If the government fails the first inquiry, the action is
invalid under the Establishment Clause. If it fails the second, the
practice is at least rendered highly suspect under Lemon.
D. Continuing Vitality of the Lemon Methodology
Notwithstanding its shortcomings, the Lemon test remains the
framework for analyzing establishment clause challenges to govern-
mental action. The Supreme Court has employed the test in all but a
handful of establishment clause cases in the years since its articula-
tion 68 and has repeatedly declined the opportunity to repudiate it.69
The Lemon methodology's repeated application in the face of frequent
criticism 70 illustrates the continuing vitality of its mandate of gov-
ernment neutrality toward religion.71
Several courts have also stated that the divisiveness inquiry is applied mainly in cases
involving financial subsidies to parochial schools. See, for example, id. (declining to inquire into
political divisiveness because the issue of state subsidies to church-sponsored schools was not
involved); Mueller, 463 U.S. at 403-04 n.11 (noting that the divisiveness inquiry should be
regarded as limited to direct subsidy cases); Vernon v. City of Los Angeles, 27 F.3d 1385, 1401
(9th Cir. 1994) (same). However, the Supreme Court and a number of other courts have
employed the divisiveness inquiry in other contexts. Brown v. Woodland Joint Unified School
District, 27 F.3d 1373, 1383 (9th Cir. 1994) (discussing Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2655-56,
120 L. Ed. 2d 467, 481 (1992), and other cases in which courts have inquired into political
fragmentation in non-school-aid cases).
67. Simson, 72 Cornel L. Rev. at 933 n.116 (cited in note 45) (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at
684).
68. See note 28.
69. See Lamb's Chapel, 113 S. Ct. at 2149-50. (Scalia, J., concurring) (lamenting the
repeated reinvigoration of the Lemon methodology).
70. See notes 23-27 and accompanying text.
71. See Grumet, 114 S. Ct. at 2487 (plurality opinion) (not relying directly upon the Lemon
test, but stating that the Establishment Clause requires that the government neither favor one
religion over others nor favor religious adherents collectively over nonadherents (citing
Epperson, 393 U.S. at 104).
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The Lemon test absolutely prohibits the government from de-
liberately providing competitive aid72 or endorsement to religion. The
test also bars the government from inadvertently furnishing too much
aid or endorsement to religion. Moreover, it prohibits the excessive
entanglement of government with religion. Finally, Lemon forbids the
government from taking action that creates the risk of political
divisiveness along religious lines.
III. APPLICATION OF THE LEMON TEST IN SIMILAR CASES
A. Challenges to Restrictions on Alcohol Sales Near Churches
The Supreme Court has never directly confronted the question
of whether a state law or local ordinance absolutely prohibiting the
sale of alcohol in the vicinity of churches violates the Establishment
Clause. The Court has, however, indicated in at least one case that it
would uphold such a law.
In Larkin v. Grendel's Den,73 the Supreme Court applied the
Lemon methodology in striking down a Massachusetts law that re-
stricted the acquisition of liquor licenses by enterprises located near
churches and schools. 74 The statute vested in the governing bodies of
schools and churches the power to block the granting of liquor licenses
to premises located within five hundred feet of the objecting institu-
tion.7 The Court rejected the state's argument that the statute was
merely a legislative exercise of zoning power and concluded instead
that the law implicated the Establishment Clause by delegating legis-
lative "veto power" to religious institutions. 76 Assuming that the law
effectuated its stated secular objective of protecting spiritual, cultural,
and educational institutions from the "hurly-burly" associated with
liquor-serving establishments, 77 the Court decided the case on the
basis of second and third prongs of the Lemon test."8
72. For a discussion of the concept of competitive aid, see notes 151-54 and accompanying
text.
73. 459 U.S. 116 (1982).
74. Id. at 120-27.
75. Id. at 117.
76. Id. at 122. The Court relied upon the construction of the statute by the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts, which in an earlier case had interpreted the law as delegating
"veto power" to religious institutions. Id. (citing Arno v. Alcoholic Beverages Control Comm'n,
384 N.E.2d 1223, 1227 (Mass. 1979)).
77. Id. at 123 n.6. The Court noted that the church in question was already surrounded
by twenty-six liquor outlets and conceded that this fact cast doubt upon its assumption that the
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The Court first scrutinized the statute under the effect prong.
The Court noted that the veto power vested in churches by the law
was standardless, requiring no supporting reasons or findings.
7 9
Nothing in the statute prevented a church from utilizing this un-
bounded power for explicitly religious purposes. 0 Even if churches
could be trusted not to use the power to advance religion, the Court
reasoned, the law created the appearance of a joint exercise of legisla-
tive authority by church and state, providing a significant symbolic
benefit to religion.81 As such, the law had the primary effect of ad-
vancing religion.8 2
Although the determination that the statute failed under the
effect prong was sufficient to support a holding that the law violated
the Establishment Clause, the Court nevertheless examined the stat-
ute under the entanglement prong as well. The Court concluded that
the statute vested a core governmental power in religious institu-
tions.8 3 Noting that a primary concern underlying the Establishment
Clause is preventing the fusion of governmental and religious func-
tions,84 the Court held that the law unconstitutionally entangled the
church in the processes of government and created the danger of
political fragmentation along religious lines.85
The Grendel's Den Court did not decide whether the statute
would have survived scrutiny under the first prong of the Lemon
test.86 The Court stated in dicta that the statute embraced the valid,
secular purpose of insulating schools and churches from the commo-
tion associated with liquor stores. 87 The Court declared, however,
that this purpose could be readily served without granting exclusive
law met its purpose of shielding the church from disruption. Id. The Court appears to have
assumed this was a secular purpose because the liquor license applicant failed to argue in the
proceedings below that the law lacked a valid secular purpose. See id. at 119.
78. The Court made its decision "[i]ndependent[ly] of the first of [the Lemon] criteria." Id.
at 123.
79. Id. at 125.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 125-26.
82. Id. at 126.
83. Id. at 127.
84. Id. at 126.
85. Id. at 127.
86. Espresso, 884 F. Supp. at 10 n.7. Whether or not the statute in Grendel's Den would
have failed the first prong of Lemon depends largely upon what it means for a governmental
action to "reflect" a secular purpose. See Lemon, 492 U.S. at 612. The language employed by
the Court in Lemon itself indicates that a statute's stated legislative intent should be accorded
"appropriate deference," as long as it is not undermined by other factors. Id. at 613. See also
notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
87. Grendel's Den, 459 U.S. at 123-24.
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and unilateral legislative power to a church.88 The Court noted that a
complete legislative ban on the issuance of liquor licenses within
reasonable, prescribed distances of churches, schools, and other like
institutions would be a possible alternative. 9 By doing so, the Court
strongly implied that without the veto provision, the statute would
have survived scrutiny under Lemon.90
Since the Supreme Court decided Grendel's Den, a number of
other courts have invalidated similar regulatory provisions.91 For
example, in Espresso, Inc. v. District of Columbia,92 the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia enjoined enforcement of a
District of Columbia municipal regulation. The challenged provision
prohibited the Alcoholic Beverage Control Board from issuing a liquor
license to any establishment within four hundred feet of a church
with more than one hundred members, absent written consent by the
church.93 The court rejected the defendant's argument that the
distinction between the written consent provision in the District of
Columbia regulation and the written objection provision struck down
in Grendel's Den was constitutionally significant, and held that the
regulation failed under the second and third prongs of Lemon.94
The Espresso court gave a liberal reading to the Grendel's Den
dictum that an absolute legislative ban on liquor sales close to a
church might be an acceptable alternative to a law vesting veto power
in a religious institution. Seizing on this language, the court stated
that an absolute ban on all liquor licenses within four hundred feet of
any church would "unquestionably pass constitutional muster."95
Thus, although no federal court has upheld an absolute legisla-
tive prohibition on the sale of alcohol in the vicinity of religious insti-
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Indeed, the Court pointed out that at the time the case was decided, twenty-seven
states had laws prohibiting liquor outlets within a prescribed distance of various types of
protected institutions, including churches. Id. at 124 n.7.
91. See, for example, Espresso, Inc., 884 F. Supp. at 12 (enjoining enforcement of a similar
statute); First Baptist Church of Brisbee v. Arizona State Liquor Board, 716 P.2d 81, 83 (Ariz.
1986) (invalidating veto provision and allowing remainder of statute to stand); Farris v. Mini
Mart Foods, Inc., 684 S.W.2d 845, 849 (Ky. 1984) (invalidating entire statute with veto provi-
sion).
92. 884 F. Supp. 7 (D.D.C. 1995).
93. Id. at 8. A District of Columbia municipal regulation prohibited the issuance of a
liquor license "for any establishment within four hundred feet of any ... church... ." 27
D.C.M.R. § 302.1. A more detailed subsection allowed the Board, in its discretion, to issue a
license to a business within four hundred feet of a church if either (a) the church had a
membership of less than 100 persons, or (b) the church had one hundred or more members and
its governing body provided written consent. 27 D.C.M.R. § 302.5.
94. 884 F. Supp. at 11.
95. Id. at 12.
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tutions, the Supreme Court and several other courts have at least
suggested that such legislation would survive under Lemon.
B. Challenges to Restrictions on Sunday and Holiday Activities
No federal court has heard an establishment clause challenge
to a legislative enactment barring the sale of alcoholic beverages on
Sunday. The Supreme Court has, however, decided several cases
dealing with other "Blue Laws."96
In McGowan v. Maryland,9 7 for example, the Court rejected a
constitutional challenge to a state law banning various forms of retail
sales activity on Sunday. Employees of a large department store were
convicted and fined under the statute for selling on Sunday a loose-
leaf binder, a can of floor wax, a stapler, staples, and a toy.98 After
rejecting the employees' equal protection claim,99 the Court held that
the employees had no standing to claim a free exercise violation. 100 In
its establishment clause analysis, the Court concluded that despite
the undeniable religious origins of the Blue Laws, 101 Sunday closing
laws in the modern setting serve the valid secular purpose of
providing a uniform day of rest for all citizens.
10 2
In a compelling dissent, Justice William 0. Douglas inter-
preted the religious guarantees of the First Amendment in stricter
terms than did the majority.10 3 According to Justice Douglas, the Free
Exercise and Establishment Clauses command the government to be
completely neutral on matters of religion.0 4 He reasoned that just as
the First Amendment bars the government from financing a selected
church, it protects citizens against laws that penalize them in any
96. Blue Laws are enactments that regulate entertainment activities, work, and
commerce on Sundays. Black's Law Dictionary 173 (West, 6th ed. 1990).
97. 366 U.S. 420 (1961). McGowan was decided along with four companion cases in which
the Court rejected claims that Sunday closing laws violated the religion clauses.
98. Id. at 422.
99. Noting that there was no indication that the distinctions drawn by the statute were
irrational or unreasonable, the Court rejected the claim. Id. at 425-28.
100. The employees alleged only economic injury and not infringement of their own
religious freedom. Id. at 429-30.
101. Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Warren stated that "[there is no dispute that the
original laws which dealt with Sunday Labor were motivated by religious forces." Id. at 431.
102. Id. at 444-45. McGowan was decided before the Court announced the Lenion
methodology.
103. Justice Douglas criticized the majority, stating, "The Court balances the need of the
people for rest, recreation, late sleeping, family visiting, and the like against the command of
the First Amendment that no one need bow to the religious beliefs of another. There is in this
realm no room for balancing." Id. at 575 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
104. Id. at 564.
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way for not observing a given religious custom, practice, or belief.'0 5
The law at issue did just that by compelling all citizens, regardless of
their own beliefs, to observe the Christian Sabbath. By penalizing
those who chose not to observe Sunday as the Sabbath, he concluded,
the statute was as offensive to the Establishment Clause as a law
punishing those who would refuse to fast from sunrise to sunset dur-
ing the Moslem month of Ramadan.10 6
To Justice Douglas, the secular justification offered by the
Court was unconvincing. Although legislatures and courts might now
characterize Sunday closing laws as serving the secular purpose of
providing a uniform day of rest, these enactments are undeniably
traceable to the Fourth Commandment.'0 7 Justice Douglas reasoned
that Sunday, the Sabbath of the dominant denominations in our
nation, is no less the Sabbath because it has become expedient for
nonreligious purposes.08 The First Amendment, he urged, forbids the
legislative majority from imposing its religious beliefs or customs
upon the people. 09
In a more recent case, Griswold Inn, Inc. v. State,1' 0 the
Connecticut Supreme Court employed the Lemon methodology to
invalidate a state law that banned the sale of alcohol on Good
Friday.", The court rejected the state's argument that the law served
the secular purpose of prohibiting the sale of alcohol on a holiday that
enjoys statewide celebration,112 pointing out that the statute made
Good Friday the only day of the year on which liquor could not be
purchased."3 Had the legislature truly been concerned with the
secular celebration of a holiday, the court reasoned, it would have
prohibited the sale of alcohol on other holidays as well."1 Given the
traditional and continued Christian exhortation to fast and mourn on
Good Friday for the death of Christ, and the lack of public acceptance
of the day as a secular holiday, the court concluded that singling out
105. Id.
106. Id. at 564-65.
107. Id. at 572-73. See also note 7 and accompanying text.
108. Id. at 573 n.6.
109. See id. at 575 C'A legislature of Christians can no more make minorities conform to
their weekly regime than a legislature of Moslems, or a legislature of Hindus.").
110. 441 A.2d 16 (Conn. 1981).
111. Id. at 22.
112. The law appears to have contained no statement of purpose. The Court noted that "[a]
reading of [the statute] shows that [the secular purpose contended by the defendants] could not
be the legislative intent." Id. at 20.
113. Id.
114. Id.
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that day alone revealed that the legislature could not have had a valid
secular purpose for passing the law."1
Although the Connecticut statute's failure to satisfy the first
component of the Lemon test was sufficient to support a holding that
the law was unconstitutional, 116 the court nevertheless undertook
analysis under the second and third prongs as well. The court con-
cluded that the enactment failed the second part of the Lemon test
because the law had the primary effect of advancing religion." 7 The
very existence of a legal prohibition on a major Christian holiday gave
the rites and practices observed on that day governmental endorse-
ment, illustrating an unallowable bias in favor of the dominant
Christian sects and against those with different beliefs.11S Moreover,
the court reasoned, the law went beyond mere approval by actually
imposing the observance of a purely religious holiday on all citizens. 19
The Griswold Inn court also determined that by requiring the
state to monitor observance of a religious holiday in order to enforce
the law, the statute violated the entanglement prong of Lemon as
well.12 Moreover, the court concluded that the legislative and popular
debate over the prohibition encouraged political divisions and debate
along religious lines, pitting Christians against non-Christians. 2' In
the court's view, this sort of fragmentation on matters of religion was
one of the principal evils against which the Establishment Clause was
intended to protect. 22
In a similar case, Silver Rose Entertainment, Inc. v. Clay
County,123 the Florida Court of Appeals upheld an ordinance banning
the sale of alcohol on Christmas day. The court concluded that the
enactment satisfied all three elements of the Lemon test.124 Noting
that the challenged enactment contained no explicit statement of
purpose, the court refused to infer that it was motivated by an uncon-
stitutional purpose, despite the significance of Christmas as a reli-
115. Id. at 20-21.
116. See id. at 22-23 (Healey, J., concurring).
117. Id. at 21-22.
118. Id.
119. Id. The court rejected the contention that the primary effect of the statute was to
promote traffic safety. The state had argued that Good Friday presents special highway safety
problems because it represents for many people the first opportunity to engage in outdoor rec-
reational activity following "a dreary cold winter" The court stated that any problem of alcohol
abuse on this day was speculative and incidental to the prohibition's religious impact. Id. at 22.
120. Id. at 22.
121. Id.
122. Id. (citing Meek, 421 U.S. at 372).
123. 646 So.2d 246 (Fla. Ct. App. 1994).
124. Id. at 252-53.
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gious holiday.125 The court concluded instead that the law served two
valid secular purposes: encouraging purveyors of alcohol to relax with
their families on Christmas day and discouraging the consumption of
alcohol on that day.126 With almost no analysis, the court then held
that the prohibition did not have a primary effect of advancing relig-
ion, that it did not entangle government with religion in an impermis-
sible way, and that it did not endorse the religious practices or beliefs
of some citizens. 27 The court distinguished Griswold Inn, asserting
that unlike Good Friday, Christmas enjoys a special constitutional
status because of the secular traditions associated with it. 128
IV. EVALUATION OF ABSOLUTE LEGISLATIVE PROHIBITIONS ON THE
SALE OF ALCOHOL NEAR CHURCHES
When the Supreme Court decided Grendel's Den, at least
twenty-seven states had laws prohibiting the sale of intoxicating
liquors close to churches. 2 9  Eleven other states directed the
authorities charged with issuing liquor licenses to consider the
proximity of the proposed establishment to protected institutions such
as churches. 130  Today, at least twenty states' 3' and numerous
municipalities in other states 32 maintain such restrictions.
No court has seriously questioned the constitutional validity of
an absolute legislative ban on the sale of alcoholic beverages close to
religious institutions. Indeed, the Grendel's Den and Espresso
courts, 33 as well as several others, have suggested that they would
uphold such legislation as a valid exercise of state zoning power.34
125. Id. at 252.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 252-53.
128. Id. at 253. The court analogized Christmas to Sunday, citing McGowan for the prop-
osition that people of all religions and with no religion regard Christmas, like Sunday, as a day
for family activity and the like. Id. at 252 (citing McGowan, 366 U.S. at 452).
129. 459 U.S. at 124 n.7. The Court explicitly refrained from passing on the validity of any
such statute other than the Massachusetts law at issue in the case. Id. As noted above,
however, the Court implied that absolute legislative bans on liquor sales within reasonable pre-
scribed distances of churches would be valid. Id. at 123-24. See notes 87-90 and accompanying
text.
130. Grendel's Den, 439 U.S. at 124 n.7.
131. See notes 2 and 4 and accompanying text.
132. See notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
133. 459 U.S. at 123-24; 884 F. Supp. at 12.
134. See, for example, First Baptist Church of Brisbee, 716 P.2d at 83-84 (stating that
without a church veto provision the legislature might constitutionally provide that no liquor
license may be issued within a reasonable distance of a church); Farris, 684 S.W.2d at 849
(stating that the statute at issue might have been valid without a provision delegating veto
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These courts have not characterized bans on the sale of alcoholic
beverages near churches as "de minimis" or "historical" exceptions to
the Establishment Clause, but rather as serving a secular purpose. 13 5
A. No Valid Secular Purpose
Few, if any, legislative prohibitions of the sale of alcoholic
beverages in the vicinity of churches contain explicit statements of
purpose. For this reason, a court faced with an establishment clause
challenge to such an enactment would likely be left to infer legislative
intent in order to evaluate it under Lemon's first prong.
A court could not realistically find legislation banning the sale
of alcoholic beverages near churches 136 to be intended to serve a secu-
lar purpose. Such enactments affect only two classes of
citizens-those who practice their religious beliefs at churches and
the patrons and owners of enterprises that wish to sell alcoholic
beverages.137 Since such legislation restricts the legitimate economic
activity of potential purveyors and consumers of alcoholic beverages,
it cannot possibly be intended to benefit this group. 138 Rather, laws
prohibiting alcohol sales near churches can only be intended to aid
churches and those who worship in churches. 39
Indeed, in cases involving similar statutes, courts have found
the regulation of alcohol sales near churches to be intended to insu-
late churches from the disruption associated with activities at liquor
outlets.140 These courts have concluded, however, that this legislative
aim constitutes a valid secular purpose under the first prong of the
power to a church); Wiles v. Michigan Liquor Control Commission, 229 N.W.2d 434, 437 (Mich.
1975) (holding a five hundred foot ban to be constitutional).
135. See, for example, Grendel's Den, 459 U.S. at 123-24 ("There can be little doubt that
[protecting a church from the commotion associated with liquor sales] embraces [a] valid
secular... purpose[ ]."); Wiles, 229 N.W.2d at 437 (concluding that a legislative ban served a
valid secular purpose).
136. Most legislative prohibitions on the sale of alcohol in the vicinity of churches define
"church" broadly enough to include any facility used for regular religious worship. See, for
example, Code of the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee §
7.08.010 (1995) (defining "church" as "a building or property where a congregation regularly
meets at least one day per week for religious worship"). Such enactments therefore do not
embody the prohibited governmental preference of one religious sect over another. As dem-
onstrated below, however, these regulations do embrace the equally impermissible state
preference for religion over nonreligion. See Epperson, 393 U.S. at 103-04 (stating that the
Establishment Clause mandates governmental neutrality between religion and nonreligion).
137. Krebs, 59 Wash. L. Rev. at 95 (cited in note 35).
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. See cases discussed in Part llI.A.
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Lemon test.'4 ' Of course, a state may have a valid secular interest in
attempting to shield schools, playgrounds, and other such institutions
from disruption. 142 The extension of such protection to institutions
that have a primarily religious purpose, however, embraces a relig-
ious purpose and violates the Establishment Clause.'"
Legislative prohibitions on the sale of alcoholic beverages in
the vicinity of churches are intended to provide church-goers with a
peaceful environment in which to practice their religion.'" In order to
create such an atmosphere, these regulations require nearby business
owners to refrain from selling certain products. Such regulations are
thus aimed directly at promoting religious activity over other activi-
ties. Such a purpose can hardly be characterized as "secular."
Indeed, many of the states that ban alcohol sales near
churches allow numerous other "disruptive" activities in the vicinity
of such institutions. Restaurants, shopping malls, and movie thea-
ters, for example, may operate freely close to churches. In addition,
stores that may not sell beer or wine because they are located close to
religious institutions may sell a host of other products. Such
activities create no less commotion or disruption than the sale of
alcohol. A legislature truly concerned with preventing general
disruption would restrict these activities as well. Alcohol sales are
restricted only because of a perceived religion-based incompatibility
between alcohol and religion. 45 Legislation that embraces such a
religious purpose must fail under the first prong of Lemon.
B. Primary Effect of Advancing Religion
Even if legislative prohibitions on the sale of alcohol near
churches do somehow embrace a valid secular purpose, they have the
primary effect of advancing religion over non-religion, and therefore
must fail under the second Lemon consideration. While state legisla-
tures might not intend such enactments to promote the practice of
religion at the expense of neighboring businesses, these laws unques-
tionably have such an effect. Businesses located near religious insti-
tutions must forego the additional clientele and revenue that would
141. See id.
142. Krebs, 59 Wash. L. Rev. at 95 (cited in note 35).
143. See id. at 95 ("[Wjhen a state seeks to protect churches from such disturbances
through a statute aimed directly toward that end, it risks establishment clause violation.").
144. See Grendel's Den, 459 U.S. at 123 (describing a Massachusetts law restricting the
sale of alcohol near churches as being aimed at protecting spiritual centers from the disruption
associated with liquor sales).
145. See note 8 and accompanying text.
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result from alcohol sales. 146 Such legislative prohibitions thus have
the effect of forcing some citizens-the owners and clientele of stores
located in the vicinity of religious institutions-to refrain from engag-
ing in legitimate economic activity so that church-goers may practice
their religions free from the disruption associated with alcohol. The
promotion of religion over other activities is impermissible under the
second prong of the Lemon test.
In addition, these regulations cannot survive scrutiny under
the "apparent endorsement" arm of the effect prong. Such laws are
likely to be viewed by members of religious institutions as en-
dorsements, and by non-members as disapprovals, of their individual
religious choices.147 Through these enactments, legislatures send an
unmistakable message that religious activity is worthy of governmen-
tal protection and that church members are favored members of the
political community.148 Likewise, legislative bans on alcohol sales
near churches send an accompanying message to those who are not
members of these religious institutions that they are outsiders-sec-
ond-class citizens.149 The message is particularly harsh for the owners
of businesses located near churches, who must give up the additional
revenue that alcohol sales might generate. The Establishment Clause
forbids the passage and enforcement of legislation that communicates
such a message. 150
The Supreme Court has in certain contexts allowed state and
local government to provide various forms of aid to religious institu-
tions. For example, the Court has stated on a number of occasions
that the Establishment Clause does not prohibit municipalities from
providing fire protection to such institutions. 5, If local governments
did not offer this service, religious organizations would have to secure
fire protection on their own. 52- Providing this type of service thus
supports these institutions by relieving them of a material operating
expense. 153
146. Krebs, 59 Wash. L. Rev. at 99 (cited in note 35).
147. See Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 597 (citing Grand Rapids, 473 U.S. at 390) (discussing the
endorsement inquiry).
148. See id. (citing Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688 (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
149. See id. (stating that the apparent endorsement inquiry turns on the message
communicated by the governmental action in question).
150. See id. (discussing the endorsement test).
151. See Simson, 72 Cornell L. Rev. at 921 (cited in note 45) (citing Nyquist, 413 U.S. at
781-82; Everson, 330 U.S. at 17-18). Municipalities may also provide religious institutions a
variety of other similar forms of aid, including police protection, sewage disposal, and sidewalks.
See Nyquiet, 413 U.S. at 781; Everson, 330 U.S. at 17-18.
152. Simson, 72 Cornell L. Rev. at 921 (cited in note 45).
153. Id.
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The support offered to religious institutions in the form of fire
protection, however, differs in at least two important respects from
the aid provided by legislative bans on alcohol sales near such
institutions. First, the government provides fire service to all citizens
without regard to their religious beliefs or practices.5 4 Legislative
prohibitions on the sale of alcoholic beverages near religious
institutions, on the other hand, do not benefit all citizens. Such bans
benefit only those who practice their religions at these institutions.
Moreover, these enactments directly burden the owners of businesses
in the vicinity of religious institutions by prohibiting them from
engaging in legitimate business activity.
Second, because fire protection is provided to all citizens
regardless of their religious convictions, nonreligious citizens are not
likely to view the provision of this service as an endorsement of relig-
ion. Enactments banning the sale of alcohol near religious institu-
tions, on the other hand, benefit only those who worship at these
institutions. Such laws thus send out a strong message to local store
owners that the political establishment views their economic well-
being as less important than the religious practices of other citizens.
Because these bans result in such an apparent endorsement of relig-
ion over nonreligion, they cannot pass muster under the second prong
of the Lemon test.
C. Political Divisiveness Along Religious Lines
Enactments banning the sale of alcohol in the vicinity of
churches do not result in the kind of close and continuing relationship
between government and religion that the Court held to be unconsti-
tutional in Lemon and Grendel's Den.155 These laws do, however, im-
permissibly cause political divisiveness along religious lines. 156 By
benefiting the practice of religion at the expense of local business,
such enactments pit religion against business. Attempting to open
new restaurants serving alcoholic beverages involves considerable
extra expense to plan around such enactments. Often developers
must lobby city and state governments for exemptions to legislation
that would otherwise preclude them from selling alcohol at their new
154. Fire protection, "provided in common to all citizens, [is] 'so separate and so
indisputably marked off from the religious function' that [it] may fairly be viewed as reflect[ing]
a neutral posture toward religious institutions." Simson, 72 Cornell L. Rev. at 921 (cited in note
45) (quoting Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 781-82; Everson, 330 U.S. at 18).
155. See notes 55-60 and 83-85 and accompanying text.
156. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 622 ("[P]olitical division along religious lines was one of the
principal evils against which the First Amendment was intended to protect.").
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businesses. 57 Their efforts typically produce political response from
members of the religious community who wish to maintain the status
quo. 158
The controversy surrounding the construction of the Nashville
Arena in Tennessee provides a recent example of the political divi-
siveness that legislative bans on the sale of alcoholic beverages near
churches can cause. The developers of the arena planned to apply for
a license to sell beer at arena events. During construction, it was
discovered that the arena site is located eighty-five feet from a Baptist
church. 59 Opponents of alcohol sales at arena events, including the
minister and various members of the church, launched a campaign to
force the metropolitan government to refuse to grant the arena's
operators a license to sell beer. 60 They rallied around the county's
ordinance barring the sale of beer within one hundred feet of a
church.'6 1 In response, the developers lobbied county authorities for
an exemption to the ordinance. 162 The entire community found itself
embroiled in a heated debate that continued even after the city coun-
cil voted to exempt the new arena from the ban on beer sales. 63
The debate over beer sales at the arena constituted precisely
the type of divisiveness along religious lines that the Lemon Court
found to be unacceptable under the Establishment Clause. 164 To the
Lemon Court, the mere potential for this type of political division was
enough to render two state regulatory schemes constitutionally inva-
157. See, for example, Richard Locker, Churches, New Arena Vie over No-Booze Rule, The
Commercial Appeal 1A (June 7, 1995) (discussing frequent exemptions granted to new restau-
rants in downtown Nashville).
158. See, for example, Thomas J. Fitzgerald and Elizabeth Murray, Last Roadblock to
Devils Move is Gone; In Showdown Vote, Nashville Allows Beer Sales in Arena, The Record A12
(June 7, 1995) (discussing the mobilization of religious conservatives to enforce a ban on beer
sales in the new Nashville Arena).
159. Locker, The Commercial Appeal at 1A (cited in note 157).
160. Religion News, The Plain Dealer 7E (Feb. 4, 1995).
161. Id.
162. Stephen G. Hirsch and Thomas J. Fitzgerald, Vote Set Tonight on Devils Issue; Beer
Legal at Nashville Arena?, The Record A5 (June 6, 1995). See also Fitzgerald and Murray, The
Record at A12 (cited in note 158) ("The ordinance [exempting the arena from the beer ban] got
enough votes only after intense lobbying.").
163. The issue of beer sales at the new arena almost prompted one of Nashville's best-
known pastors to run against the city's incumbent mayor, who supported the arena exemption.
Locker, The Commercial Appeal at 1A (cited in note 157). See also Fitzgerald and Murray, The
Record at A12 (cited in note 158) (noting that preachers urged their parishioners to flood the
city council with letters and telephone calls to express their discontent with the arena ex-
emption).
164. But see notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
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lid.165 The controversy over the Nashville arena illustrates that legis-
lative bans on alcohol sales in the vicinity of churches actually cause
political divisiveness along religious lines. For this reason such en-
actments cannot survive scrutiny under the political divisiveness
component of the Lemon test's third prong.
Thus, legislative bans on the sale of alcohol in the vicinity of
religious institutions clearly violate the first two elements of the
Lemon test. Such enactments are intended to serve the impermissible
religious purpose of providing members of religious institutions with a
zone of protection in which to practice their faiths. Moreover,
regulations of this sort promote the practice of religion at the expense
of local business. Such laws send out a clear message that the
members of religious institutions enjoy favored, "insider" status and
that the business interests of other citizens are less important to the
government. The enforcement of these bans also creates political
divisiveness along religious lines. They are therefore highly suspect
under Lemon's third prong. For these reasons, such enactments
cannot stand under the Establishment Clause.
V. EVALUATION OF RESTRICTIONS ON SUNDAY ALCOHOL SALES
A number of states and many municipalities in other states
maintain and enforce legislation restricting the sale of alcohol on
Sunday. 166 While the Supreme Court has upheld a number of Sunday
Blue Laws under the Establishment Clause,167 no court has directly
addressed the constitutionality of a legislative prohibition on the sale
of alcoholic beverages on Sunday. Like enactments proscribing the
sale of alcohol in the vicinity of religious institutions, Sunday prohibi-
tions cannot survive under the Lemon test.
A. No Valid Secular Purpose
Very few, if any, enactments barring the sale of alcohol on
Sunday contain explicit statements of legislative purpose. For this
reason, courts faced with establishment clause challenges to such
165. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 622-24 (stating that the potential for political divisiveness
along religious lines threatens the political process by obscuring issues of great urgency-issues
on which our legislature should focus).
166. See note 5 and accompanying text.
167. See Part III.B.
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regulations must infer purpose in order to perform analysis under the
first prong of the Lemon test.
History reveals that legislative restrictions of alcohol sales on
Sunday, like other Blue Laws, are rooted in the biblical command to
observe the Sabbath.16s Courts' applications of the older versions of
many Sunday laws demonstrate their religious origins. 169 Such laws
were intended to prohibit worldly activity on a day set aside for wor-
ship. 170
Enactments restricting the sale of alcohol on Sundays are sim-
ply modern versions of these older laws. The religious basis of these
laws has not disappeared;17 1 legislative prohibitions on Sunday alcohol
sales are still based upon a perceived incompatibility between religion
and alcohol. Like other Blue Laws, these enactments prohibit activity
historically believed to be incongruous with observance of the
Sabbath.
In McGowan v. Maryland,12 the Supreme Court held that not-
withstanding the original religious purposes of Sunday laws, such
enactments now serve the valid secular purpose of providing a
uniform day of rest for all citizens regardless of religion.' 3 Perhaps
the most plausible secular justification offered by proponents of laws
banning the sale of alcohol on Sunday is that such enactments are
aimed at promoting safety on this secular day of rest. Supporters
argue that the prohibition on alcohol sales on Sunday reduces the risk
of accidents on a day when many people travel to visit family or
engage in other recreational activities. The need for safety is no
greater, however, on this day of rest than it is on days of work.
Indeed, alcohol-impaired work is a greater risk to society than
alcohol-impaired rest. Moreover, at least as many people drive their
cars on work days as on Sundays. For these reasons, the secular
168. See note 7 and accompanying text.
169. See, for example, McGowan, 366 U.S. at 570 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (quoting
Commonwealth v. McCarthy, 138 N.E. 835, 836 (Mass. 1923) (stating that the aim of a Massa-
chusetts Sunday law was "'to secure respect and reverence for the Lord's Day.' "); Sparhawk v.
Union Passenger Railway Co., 54 Pa. 401, 423 (1867) ("Rest and quiet, on the Sabbath day, with
the right and privilege of public and private worship, undisturbed by any mere worldly
employment, are exactly what the statute was passed to protect.")).
170. See id. at 569 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (quoting Davis v. City of Somerville, 128 Mass.
594, 596 (1880)) (stating that "[o]ur Puritan ancestors saw fit to enforce with penal legislation
the observance of Sunday as a day devoted to worship undisturbed by secular cares or amuse-
ments").
171. See id. at 573 n.6 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (stating that the historical basis of Blue
Laws cannot be swept aside merely because Sunday has taken on secular significance).
172. 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
173. Id. at 444-45.
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justification offered by proponents of Sunday bans on alcohol sales is
far from compelling. The religious basis for such laws cannot be so
easily swept aside.
Even if we assume that prohibiting the sale of alcohol all day
on Sunday is actually intended by legislatures to make the common
day of rest safer for recreational activities, this justification does not
work for Sunday-morning bans. Sunday morning presents no safety
risk that is not present during the rest of the day. The argument that
Sunday morning creates alcohol-related problems that are not present
during the rest of the day on Sunday, or on other mornings, is specu-
lative at best. Indeed, the religious meaning of Sunday morning
constitutes the only attribute of that part of the day that sets it apart
from the rest of Sunday and from other mornings. Sunday morning is
the time that adherents of the dominant religions congregate to
worship.174 The singling out of this time of the week reveals that no
clear secular purpose justifies the prohibition of alcohol sales during
this part of the day. 175 Thus, these bans must instead be intended to
require that the behavior of all citizens conform to the religious values
of the legislative majority. Such prohibitions fail under the first
prong of the Lemon test.
B. Primary Effect of Advancing Religion
Even if legislative restrictions on the sale of alcohol on Sunday
do embrace a valid secular purpose, such enactments have the pri-
mary effect of advancing religion. For this reason they cannot survive
the second prong of the Lemon test.
By proscribing behavior thought to be incompatible with ob-
servance of the Sabbath on Sunday, these laws advance religion, in
general, over nonreligion, and they promote faiths that observe a
Sunday Sabbath over other faiths. 176 Moslems, Jews, Seventh Day
Adventists, and atheists must forego legitimate nonreligious conduct
so that the values of dominant denominations are not offended and so
174. The Supreme Court has acknowledged the religious significance of Sunday morning in
the context of Blue Laws, stating that "most Christian church services are held on Sunday
morning .... McGowan, 366 U.S. at 445.
175. See Griswold Inn, 441 A.2d at 20 (stating that the singling out of Good Friday, a
religious holiday for Christians, reveals that legislation barring alcohol sales on that day alone
has no clear secular purpose).
176. See McGowan, 366 U.S. at 576 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (stating that Sunday closing
laws "force [religious] minorities to obey the majority's religious feelings of what is due and
proper for a Christian community"); Griswold Inn, 441 A-2d at 21 (stating that a legislative ban
on liquor sales on Good Friday had the effect of imposing the observance of Christian practices
on Christians and non-Christians alike).
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that adherents of these faiths may worship in peace.' 77
Denominations that observe a Sunday Sabbath, on the other hand,
are free to engage in a full range of worldly pursuits on Friday, the
traditional day of worship for Moslems, and on Saturday, the Sabbath
for Jews and Seventh Day Adventists. Indeed, citizens who worship
on days other than Sunday must observe two Sabbaths, one of their
own choice and another imposed on them by law. 78 Legislative en-
actments that result in such a direct preference for some religions
over others cannot stand under the Establishment Clause.
Legislative bans on Sunday alcohol sales also require some
citizens to refrain from engaging in legitimate economic activity so
that the practice of observing the Sabbath on that day is not
disturbed. These enactments have the effect of forcing store owners
to give up the additional revenue that the sale of alcohol on Sunday
mornings might produce.179 Such laws thus promote the religion over
other activities. This effect is impermissible under the second prong
of the Lemon test.
In addition, legislative restrictions on Sunday alcohol sales
have the effect of putting the force of law behind the religious values
of the legislative majority, thereby placing coercive pressure on all
citizens to conform with officially sanctioned practices.180 Those who
choose not to conform with these practices face fines or even jail.'8 '
Enactments that impose criminal sanctions for noncompliance with
the religious tenets of the dominant faith can hardly be characterized
as "neutral" toward religion.' 2  Such laws have the impermissible
effect of advancing religion.
177. See McGowan, 366 U.S. at 578 n.10 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (stating that Sunday clos-
ing laws assist Christianity by making idleness compulsory on the Christian Sabbath) (citation
omitted).
178. See id. at 577 (stating that a Sunday closing law forced non-Christians to observe a
second Sabbath).
179. See Krebs, 59 Wash. L. Rev. at 99 (cited in note 35) (arguing that the ban of alcohol
sales near churches has the impermissible effect of forcing store owners to give up the
additional clientele and revenues that alcohol sales would create). This argument is equally
compelling with respect to Sunday-morning prohibitions on alcohol sales.
180. See Griswold Inn, 441 A.2d at 21 ("When the power, prestige and financial support of
government is placed behind a particular religious beliet the indirect coercive pressure upon
religious minorities to conform to the prevailing officially approved religion is plain.") (quoting
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962)).
181. See, for example, Ark. Code Ann. § 3-3-210 (1995) (making the sale of alcohol on
Sunday a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for ten days to six months).
182. See Epperson, 393 U.S. at 103-04 ("The First Amendment mandates government
neutrality between religion and religion, and religion and nonreligion."). See also McGowan,
366 U.S. at 576 (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("There is an 'establishment' of religion in the
constitutional sense if any practice of any religious group has the sanction of law behind it.").
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Legislative prohibitions on the sale of alcohol on Sunday also
send a message to members of the denominations that observe a
Sunday Sabbath that they are favored members of the political com-
munity. 83 Likewise, these regulations send a message to nonadher-
ents of these faiths that they are political outsiders. 8 4 These people
are likely to view such enactments as affirmations of their minority
status in Christian communities. 85 Because legislative prohibitions
on Sunday-morning alcohol sales communicate a clear message of
governmental endorsement of the values of certain denominations,
these enactments cannot pass muster under the "apparent endorse-
ment" element of the Lemon test's second prong.'86
C. Political Divisiveness Along Religious Lines
Enactments barring the sale of alcoholic beverages on Sunday
mornings are also highly suspect under the third Lemon inquiry.
Although these laws do not result in an impermissibly close
relationship between religion and government, they do engender
political divisiveness along religious lines. Legislative and popular
debates over the propriety of such regulations pit religion against
religion, and religion against nonreligion. Religious institutions and
individuals who observe a Sunday Sabbath are likely to embrace such
enactments, while citizens with different beliefs are likely to object to
these regulations. Our nation's growing non-Christian population is
likely to augment the opposition to such laws.1'8 Those who oppose
religion-based laws may promote political action in order to achieve
their goals. 88 Those who embrace this legislation will inevitably
respond, employing the same political techniques. 8 9 The potential for
183. See Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 595 (stating that the apparent endorsement inquiry turns
on the message that the governmens practice communicates).
184. See id.
185. See Marc A. Stadtmauer, Remember the Sabbath? The New York Blue Laws and the
Future of the Establishment Clause, 12 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L. J. 213, 213 (1994) (stating that
Sunday Blue Laws give substance to the contention that America is a Christian nation).
186. "The clearest command of the Establishment Clause is that one religious
denomination cannot be officially preferred over another." Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 605 (quoting
Larson, 456 U.S. at 244).
187. McGowan, 366 U.S. at 566 n.1 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (citing Arthur Hartzberg, The
Protestant 'Establishment,' Catholic Dogma, and the Presidency, Commentary 285 (Oct. 1960)
(discussing the political impact of the influx of non-Protestant immigrants after World War I)).
188. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 622 (describing the potential for political division along
religious lines created by two state regulatory schemes designed to provide aid to parochial
schools).
189. Some religious groups actively advocate anti-alcohol legislation. See, for example,
Christian Life Commission, Issues & Answers: Alcohol (cited in note 8).
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conflict created by legislative prohibitions on Sunday alcohol sales is
precisely the kind of fragmentation that the Lemon Court held to be a
violation of the First Amendment. 190 Thus, such enactments are, at
the very least, highly suspect under the entanglement prong.
D. The Possibility of an Historical Justification
Those who embrace legislative bans on the sale of alcohol on
Sunday might argue that because religiously-motivated Sunday laws
were accepted at the time of the adoption of the Bill of Rights, laws
banning the sale of alcohol on Sunday morning cannot possibly violate
the Establishment Clause. Indeed, the Supreme Court used similar
reasoning in Marsh v. Chambers91 to uphold the Nebraska state legis-
lature's practice of opening its legislative sessions with a proselytizing
prayer. For at least two reasons, however, history cannot legitimate
state bans on Sunday-morning alcohol sales under the Establishment
Clause.
First, the First Amendment was not applicable to the states at
the time of its adoption.192 Because only the states, and not the fed-
eral government, had Sunday laws at the time of the adoption of the
Bill of Rights, the acceptance of such laws at that time can have no
bearing on their validity today.193  Only after the Fourteenth
Amendment was adopted did the restrictions of the First Amendment
become applicable to the states. 94 While the Supreme Court has up-
held a variety of Sunday laws since the First Amendment's incorpora-
tion into the Fourteenth, it has also invalidated a number of other
state practices that were characterized by historical acceptance. 95
Indeed, the Court has repeatedly confirmed that history alone cannot
190. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 622 (stating that the Framers intended the First Amendment
to protect against political division based on religious differences).
191. 463 U.S. 789 (1983). Marsh is one of a handful of decisions in which the Supreme
Court has not employed the Lemon methodology in facing establishment clause attacks on
governmental action. See note 28 and accompanying text.
192. McGowan, 366 U.S. at 579 n.11 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. The Marsh Court itself recognized that "[s]tanding alone, historical patterns cannot
justify contemporary violations of constitutional guarantees." Marsh, 463 U.S. at 790. Indeed,
the Court has held unconstitutional racial segregation in public schools, Brown v. Board of
Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and school prayer, School District of Abington Township,
Pennsylvania v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel, 370 U.S. at 421, both of which were
widely accepted practices during a large portion of our nation's history.
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legitimate practices that demonstrate the government's allegiance to
a particular sect or creed. 196
In addition, although a nonsectarian, proselytizing prayer can
be viewed as a harmless historical exception to the Establishment
Clause, legislative prohibitions on Sunday alcohol sales cannot be so
characterized. Such laws go far beyond mere pro forma establishment
by criminalizing behavior because it is considered to be incompatible
with the religious values of the legislative majority. History alone
cannot justify such a clear violation of the Establishment Clause.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Note endeavors to take a fresh look at the regulation of
alcohol sales in light of the principles embraced in the Supreme
Court's establishment clause jurisprudence. It attempts to establish
that legislation restricting the sale of alcohol on Sunday or near
churches is impermissibly driven by a religion-based perception of
incompatibility between religion and the consumption of alcohol.
Although it may be impossible to demonstrate conclusively that such
laws are purposeful "establishments" of religion, this Note also-more
convincingly, perhaps-tries to show that this legislation implicates
the Establishment Clause through its effects.
The day-to-day impact of legislation restricting the sale of
alcohol on Sundays or near churches is, for most of us, insignificant.
After all, if one cannot purchase wine on Sunday, one need only plan
ahead and buy it on Saturday instead. Likewise, if one cannot obtain
beer at a store near a religious institution, one need only travel a
short distance to purchase it at another establishment.
Nevertheless, such laws have an additional, more profound
impact. These enactments tell us much about the relationship be-
tween religion and government in our nation. They send a strong
message that those who hold certain religious beliefs enjoy preferred
status in the eyes of the legislative majority. Sunday restrictions, for
example, tell non-Christians that they are outsiders who must not
offend the mores of the favored majority by purchasing alcohol during
a time reserved for religious worship.
In an increasingly diverse nation, the potential for this type of
legislation to cause division among us grows. Though the Framers
196. See Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 603-05 (noting that the history of our nation contains
numerous examples of official acts endorsing Christianity, but stating that this heritage of
discrimination against non-Christians has no place in establishment clause jurisprudence).
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could not have envisioned the vast changes that have taken place over
the last two centuries, they left us the tools necessary to preserve and
protect the values upon which they created our nation. One of these
core values is that, to the extent possible, religion and government
must exist-and appear to exist-in separate spheres. This separa-
tion was intended by the Framers in part to protect against persecu-
tion and divisiveness based on religion. The Establishment Clause is
one of the tools the Framers left us to protect against these evils. We
must continue to interpret it to do so.
Steven L. Lane*
* I wish to thank Courtney Persons, Ben Roberson, Tracey Hardin, and Professor
Thomas McCoy for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this Note.
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